Is the fee-for-service model for remuneration of medical practitioners in private practice morally justifiable? by Green, Gregory
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DR GREGORY GREEN 
Student Number: 9508306V 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of MSc (Med) in Bioethics and Health Law 
 Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics, University of the Witwatersrand 
 
Johannesburg, 10 April 2015 
IS THE FEE-FOR-SERVICE MODEL FOR REMUNERATION OF MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONERS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE? 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr Kevin Behrens  BA, Hons BTh, MA, D Litt et Phil 
Senior lecturer, Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics, University of the Witwatersrand 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
This research report - entitled “Is the fee-for-service model for remuneration of 
medical practitioners in private practice morally justifiable?” – is my own unaided 
work, except where I have explicitly indicated otherwise.   I have followed the 
required conventions in referencing the thoughts and ideas of others.   It is being 
submitted for the degree of MSc Med (Bioethics and Health Law) to the University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.   It has not been submitted before, for any degree 
or examination, at this or any other University. 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Dr Gregory Green 
Johannesburg, 10 April 2015 
 
  
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
  
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this research report I defend the thesis that the fee-for-service remuneration 
model for private medical practitioners is not morally justifiable as it does not 
promote a paying patient’s best interests.   A review of the salary, capitation, pay-for-
performance and fee-for-service payment models is followed by a review of the 
philosophical fundamentals of caring for patients and promoting their best interests.   
The suitability of the fee-for-service model as it is applied to private practice is 
analysed with respect to its compliance / non-compliance with these fundamentals.   
Particular reference is given to principlism, consequentialism and virtue ethics as 
well as the South African health care environment.   In the absence of specific and 
viable alternatives I propose how a moral checklist could be applied to payment 
models generally in order to safeguard promotion of a patient’s best interests. 
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There are many bad ways to pay doctors, and no 
particularly good ones. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report evaluates the moral justifications (if any) for the fee-for-service model as 
a basis for private practitioner remuneration in South Africa.   I evaluate the suitability 
of any payment model from a purely moral perspective - as a model - rather than 
limit this to a criticism based primarily on its various clinical and economic 
consequences.   More specifically, the predominant fee-for-service model applied in 
private practice in South Africa is subjected to such a normative evaluation. 
 
First the various payment models in health care are described and classified.   This 
is followed by an account of the ethical fundamentals of caring for patients and 
promoting their best interests.   The suitability of the fee-for-service model as it is 
applied to private practice is then analysed with respect to its compliance / non-
compliance with these philosophical fundamentals. 
 
In this report I defend the thesis that the current fee-for-service remuneration model 
for private medical practitioners is not morally justifiable as it does not promote a 
paying patient’s best interests.   In the absence of specific and viable alternatives I 
propose how a moral checklist could be applied to payment models generally in 
order to safeguard promotion of a patient’s best interests. 
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1.1 Definitions 
 
Clinical 
The term ‘clinical’ is understood to refer to the practical application of a medical 
practitioner’s professional skill and training.   This could include history-taking, 
examination, performing of medical interventions and interpretation of results 
requiring the specific professional skills of the treating medical practitioner. 
 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service refers to the service-dependant payment model most often 
relied upon in private health care in South Africa, where the fee paid to a 
medical practitioner is based on the service rendered (Houle et al. 2012: W-
319).   It has also proven to be a very popular payment model internationally 
(Berenson and Rich 2010: 613).   Many also argue that it will continue to be at 
very least a necessary constituent of future payment models (Ginsburg 2012: 
1981, Goroll and Schoenbaum 2012: 578).   References to ‘fee-for-service’, 
‘fee-for-service model’, and ‘fee-for-service payment model’ are used 
interchangeably in this research.   A more detailed definition follows in chapter 
2. 
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Gaming 
When clinical risk adjustment forms the basis of payment to medical 
practitioners, manipulation of diagnosis and the relative severity of a patient’s 
clinical condition in order to maximise payment is termed ‘gaming’.   Gaming-
induced overpayments have been a criticism of managed health care services 
which encourage refinement of risk-adjustment (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 
2014: 694).   It is possible for practitioners to ‘cherry-pick’ specific patients and 
adjust their diagnoses and management in order to select for an optimal profile 
and thereby maximise their own remuneration (ibid). 
 
Good medical practice 
In this report reference to good medical practice primarily entails compliance 
with the Health Professions Council of South Africa’s formal guidelines for 
good practice for health practitioners (HPCSA (1) and (2): 2008). 
 
Health insurer 
I use this term synonymously with the term ‘medical aid’ to describe medical 
funding organisations who collect premiums from members in return for as 
required utilisation of health services. 
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Patient 
The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 refers to consumers as persons 
entering into transactions with suppliers.   The National Health Act 61 of 2003 
refers neither to patients or consumers, but rather to users of health care.   In 
my opinion, interchangeable use of the term patient and consumer is often 
counter-productive outside the context of the Consumer Protection Act.   This 
is especially so given its negative connotation with respect to commodification 
in health care.   For this reason, unless the discussion specifically refers to 
consumers in the more general legal interpretation just described, I generally 
refer to patients in this report, 
 
Payment 
Payment is used to describe remuneration received by a practitioner for the 
rendering of a health service.   This could be in the form of direct payment from 
a patient, indirect payment from their health insurer or payment via a third 
party.   I do not always make a clear distinction between them unless 
specifically relevant. 
 
Payment debate 
The focus of this report is on the fee-for-service model, which in turn 
represents just one popular theory amongst others on which payment for 
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health care services is conceptually modelled.   Broadly speaking, the 
“payment debate” refers to an ongoing international academic discussion as to 
which model, combination of models or proposed novel approach to payment 
in health care is most appropriate, effective and therefore suitable.   For the 
purposes of this research, while the term primarily refers to the overall debate, 
I occasionally refer to a much narrower interpretation synonymous with what 
we could term the “fee-for-service debate”.   Where the appropriate context 
demands it, I clarify a more specific interpretation. 
 
Practice and private practice 
The term ‘practice’ is used to refer to a medical practitioner practice in the 
private sector.   The terms ‘practice’ and ‘private practice’ are understood 
interchangeably.   Private practices can consist of single or multiple 
participating practitioners.   Regardless of the number of practitioners in a 
practice, practices in South Africa operate their business with and receive 
payments to a single legal entity with a unique practice number.   For more 
specific context, local health insurers and payment systems usually recognise 
and interact with practices by their practice numbers, and not necessarily 
always the specific practitioners who have rendered specific services.   
Agreements are often therefore entered into between health insurers and 
practices, and not necessarily between health insurers and individual 
practitioners unless they happen to be a single-man practice. 
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Practitioner 
In this report a practitioner is understood fairly loosely as a medical 
practitioner, doctor, physician or medical specialist.   These terms are used 
interchangeably.   While this research focuses on medical practitioners, the 
central themes, arguments and findings are potentially relevant to any 
professional health care provider who renders a health care service in return 
for payment. 
 
1.2 Purpose of study 
To critically defend the thesis that the fee-for-service model of remuneration for 
doctors in private practice in South Africa is morally unjustified, as it fails to 
promote the patient’s best interest. 
 
1.3 Outcome 
To develop a set of ethical criteria and principles as a fundamental basis upon 
which to evaluate the moral justification of any payment model, including 
alternatives to the fee-for-service model. 
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1.4 Outline of chapters 
The next chapter (chapter 2) outlines the context for my research question, 
provides an overview of the literature relevant to the fee-for-service payment 
debate and introduces the four principal models for medical practitioner 
remuneration.   Chapters 3 and 4 provide the theoretical background for the 
application to, and critical discussion of, the fee-for-service payment model.   In 
chapter 3, I provide a basic review of basic moral theory in health care which 
includes principlism, consequentialism and virtue ethics.   This is followed in 
chapter 4 by a description of relevant South African health care legislation as 
well as ethical guidelines for medical practitioners. 
 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of medical professionalism and the social 
contract before proposing some basic tenets of an ideal payment model.    
Chapter 6 describes the context of private practice in South Africa, and 
proposes some important assumptions for the moral evaluation of fee-for-
service.   The fee-for-service model of remuneration is critically evaluated in 
chapter 7 by highlighting the moral weaknesses of the fee-for-service model, 
as well as some of the difficulties involved with health care regulation. 
 
In the absence of specific or viable alternatives I propose a moral checklist in 
chapter 8 which could be applied to either the design or evaluation of payment 
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models generally in order to safeguard promotion of a patient’s best interests.   
The discussion in chapter 9 identifies some of the possible limitations with this 
research, but simultaneously argues its unique advantages and moral 
importance.   Chapter 10 concludes that the fee-for-service model of 
remuneration for doctors in private practice in South Africa is morally 
unjustified, as it fails to promote the patient’s best interest. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
In order to critically examine the fee-for-service model of remuneration I have briefly 
described the context of the payment debate, defined the specific objective of this 
report and outlined some of the fundamental concepts required for an informed 
discussion.   This chapter expands on some of the core issues which characterise 
the payment debate.   An overview of relevant academic literature is provided, 
followed by a description of the principal model designs which currently inform 
international medical practitioner remuneration strategy and policies. 
 
Local and international studies have shown how fee-for-service contributes to 
elevated and wasteful healthcare spending (Schroeder and Frist 2013: 2029), 
incentivises increased patient visit frequency (Broomberg and Price 1990: 134, 
Vahidi et al. 2013: 58) and dis-incentivises holistic, follow-up and health-promotion 
interventions (Vahidi et al. 2013: 58).   Despite mature debate, acknowledgement of 
the difficulties of fee-for-service, and serial policy recommendations, countries such 
as the United States have failed to reach broad consensus, and continue to be 
dominated by this payment model (Schroeder and Frist 2013: 2029). 
 
The existing literature focusing on payment systems in private health care is 
dominated by research into actual or potential outcomes of various payment models.   
The economic, cost-benefit, financial sustainability and clinical outcomes-based 
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benefits and disadvantages of payment policies are therefore well-debated.   The 
basic, principled ethical justification for the conceptual architecture of various 
payment models is, however, not usually adequately considered.   Health care exists 
primarily because people or patients require it.   The principal motivation for testing 
payment models in this way is to hopefully protect and promote their best interest.   
This paper therefore responds to a moral and logical requirement incumbent on 
health systems to examine whether the needs of patients and the model employed to 
remunerate doctors are suitably aligned. 
 
In South Africa, comparatively little research attention has been given to the 
important aspects of the payment debate.   Furthermore, neither internationally nor 
locally, has appropriate attention been given to the basic ethical justification for the 
conceptual architecture of various payment models.   The prevailing noise in 
academic literature is focused on the economic, cost-benefit, financial sustainability 
and clinical outcomes-based benefits and disadvantages of payment policies. 
 
The focus of the current payment debate is not always obviously guided by the 
reason why healthcare exists at all: to attend, as far as possible, to a patient’s 
healthcare needs, consistent with their best interests.   This paper therefore 
responds to a moral requirement incumbent on health systems to examine whether 
the needs of patients and the model employed to remunerate doctors are suitably 
aligned.   A South African perspective will be maintained with respect to our 
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particular challenges with fee-for-service.   In a rapidly changing health care 
environment, policy-makers in South Africa are bound by the Constitution (1996) to 
promote a patient’s right to dignity (s 10), bodily integrity (s 12(2)) and the 
progressive realisation of their right to health care services (s 27(1)(a), s 27(2)).   
Given the advent of significant change, particularly planning for National Health 
Insurance (NHI), the need for a robust moral standard in South African health care is 
not only apparent, but in addition relatively urgent. 
 
2.1 Overview of the literature 
As early as the 1970s an active debate began over the suitability of the fee-for-
service payment system in North American health care (Ellwood et al. 1971: 
291).   This debate was instrumental in the development of capitation1 and the 
emergence of managed health care in general (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 
2014: 693).   In response to a continued need to provide guidance for 
policymakers, a report commissioned in the United States on ‘physician 
payment reform’ provides an overview of the various payment systems and 
criticises their various contributions to rising health care costs (Frist and 
Schroeder 2013: 1-21).   Fee-for-service features prominently as a principal 
                                                     
 
1 A payment arrangement which pays medical practitioners a set amount for each (usually health-
insured) patient assigned to them, per month or year, independent of whether the patient consults the 
practitioner or not. 
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driver for inefficiency and undesirable financial incentives (Frist and Schroeder 
2013: 3).   The commission concluded: 
 
…our nation [United States] cannot control runaway medical 
spending without fundamentally changing how physicians are 
paid, including the inherent incentives built into the current fee-
for-service pay system (ibid). 
 
Some modern researchers have encouraged a more proactive approach to 
payment reform by applying ethical principles early and at policy level (Corbett 
2013: 47).   Attention given by Corbett, in his review, to vulnerable populations 
who need protection at the payment reform level is particularly relevant in the 
South African context (ibid). 
 
Other key theorists who have engaged in the debate about payment models 
include Bailey (2004: 231-235), Daschle et al. (2013: 471-474), Goroll et al. 
(2007: 410-415), Goroll and Schoenbaum (2012: 577-578), Ginsburg (2012: 
1977-1983), Maynard et al. (1986: 1438–1440), Nelson (2007: 16-18) and 
Saint-Lary et al. (2007: 485–491). 
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There is very little South African literature on the ethics of payment systems.   
On the basis of one early retrospective analysis it has been argued that the 
fee-for-service model was unjustified in the context of existing resource 
constraints at the time (Broomberg and Price 1990: 136).   The study showed 
how cost patterns differed for equivalent health care encounters between the 
economical salaried environment of a Health Maintenance Organisation (HMO) 
and the comparatively expensive fee-for-service environment of private 
medical schemes.   A current perspective on fee-for-service provided by the 
South African health insurer, Discovery Health, reflects on how doctors’ 
remuneration is, unfortunately, necessarily tied to the decisions they make for 
their patients (Bateman 2013: 443).   Legislative reform enabling hospitals to 
‘employ’ doctors and assign roles more efficiently and link salaries to the total 
costs and benefits of the system is proposed (ibid).   Rowe and Moodley 
(2013: 8) critically evaluate the Consumer Protection Act (No. 68 of 2008) and 
consider the ethical and legal implications of the shift from paternalism towards 
an increasingly consumerist model in healthcare in South Africa.   They argue 
that it potentially encourages the commodification of our already complex, 
pluralistic health system (ibid). 
 
In addition to the literature that specifically deals with the ethics of payment 
models, another source of pertinent scholarship of relevance to this study 
relates to medical professionalism and the traditional social contract, which 
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potentially informs the moral framework of the payment debate (Creuss et al. 
2000: 1189-1194, Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2008: 2-3, Williams 2009: 48-50).   
Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account the generally adopted moral 
norms and standards in health care reflected in relevant sections of South 
African health law and professional guidelines for medical practitioners 
(Constitution of South Africa 1996, Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, 
HPCSA 2005, HPCSA 2008 (Booklet 1), HPCSA 2008 (Booklet 5), Dhai and 
McQuoid-Mason 2011, National Health Act 61 of 2003). 
 
2.2 The basic payment models 
There are four principal models for medical practitioner remuneration – salary, 
capitation, fee-for-service and pay-for-performance.   The payment systems 
differ widely in their advantages, disadvantages and suitability to health care.   
All four models have been widely debated in the academic literature and will 
not be analysed in any significant detail here.   I will merely outline their basic 
characteristics here in order to assist the reader with a working understanding 
of their similarities and differences. 
 
Salary model 
The salary model is no different in many ways from the same in other 
professions or industries: a monthly salary agreed between a medical 
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practitioner and their employer.   With regard to the medical profession, 
salaries have generally been criticised for providing insufficient incentives to 
improve the quality of patient care.   Salaries which are not linked to 
performance have similarly been criticised for their failure to discourage the 
practice of sub-standard care. 
 
Capitation 
Capitation refers to a set remuneration (usually monthly) per practice-
registered patient, which is independent of the facility utilisation in a specified 
time period.   From a health insurer or state perspective, it is a very predictable 
and stable financial model.   The fee is often all-inclusive, meaning that 
medical practitioners must provide whatever services, consultations or 
consumables from it (Houle et al. 2012: W-319). 
 
Under capitation, the doctor’s income is dependent on three main factors: (1) 
how many patients are registered with the practice, (2) how efficiently the 
practice services those patients, and (3) how efficiently the practice is 
administered in general.   Capitation has therefore been criticised for its 
tendency to encourage under-servicing (Berenson and Rich 2012: 617).   For 
this reason it has even been referred to as a “fee-for-non-service” arrangement 
(Himmelstein and Woolhandler 2014: 695). 
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Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service is a payment model where, in return for delivering a medical 
service the doctor charges a monetary fee for the particular service – either to 
the patient or the patient’s health insurer.   The health-provider’s income is 
therefore entirely dependent on the total number and value of invoices they 
have raised, as well as the efficiency with which such fees are collected.   Fee-
for-service has been criticised for encouraging over-servicing due to its 
reliance on volume-based payments (Berenson and Rich 2012: 617, Goroll 
and Schoenbaum 2012: 577). 
 
Pay-for-performance 
Pay-for-performance represents a range of essentially customised 
combinations of the above three models.   Pioneered in the United States as 
an attempt to overcome some of the weaknesses of the other models, it 
assigns performance-rated variables to practitioners and patients, monitors the 
actual performance and adjusts a practitioner’s income accordingly (Berenson 
and Rich 2010: 616, Houde et al. 2012: W-319, Snyder and Neubauer 2007: 
792). 
 
The principal difficulties encountered in the pay-for-performance model 
simultaneously represent its primary criticisms.   Since clinical risk adjustment 
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
is necessary for the reasonable measure of performance, in the absence of 
strict governance the pay-for-performance model is by definition open to 
gaming (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 2014: 693-4).   Assuming risk 
adjustment is accurately recorded, who decides, and what criteria are used to 
decide, which variables best represent performance?   How are the relative 
weightings of such variables assigned to an overall performance score and 
why?   Unless a comprehensive set of performance variables are measured, 
the reward of a narrow band of clinical intervention for selected patient profiles 
might actually weaken a practitioner’s autonomy and impair overall quality of 
care (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 2014: 694).   Probably the most important 
difficulty is this: in order to maintain validity, how can such factors be reliably 
measured both over time and in multiple localities?   Notwithstanding the 
criticisms described, the complex differences between communities make it 
unlikely that a pay-for-performance model could be reproduced with 
reasonable validity across a variety of culturally, socio-economically and 
geographically distinct populations. 
 
Despite ongoing, international academic, moral and policy debate this chapter 
highlights how there does not appear to be meaningful consensus with respect 
to how best to remunerate doctors.   It is also evident how the four principal 
models just described differ significantly with respect to their basic design and 
intent.   There is a need for South Africa-focussed research which considers 
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the strengths and weaknesses of payment models in application to our specific 
context.   Whilst these four payment models exist, it is fee-for-service that is 
the adopted model for private practice in South Africa.   For this reason, it is 
this model that is the focus of my research.   Before evaluating it in any specific 
detail, I will review some basic moral fundamentals in health care as well as 
the regulatory environment in which the model finds itself in South Africa. 
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3. REVIEW OF MORAL FUNDAMENTALS IN HEALTH CARE 
In this chapter some fundamental ethical theories will be reviewed.   Nevertheless, I 
do not provide an extensive review of the suite of moral theories which influence 
health care.   Rather I provide a brief overview of how just three basic theories find 
particular application in the payment debate – namely principlism, consequentialism 
and virtue ethics.   The three theories together illustrate many of the fundamental 
standards with which any health care service should as far as possible comply.   
Later I will reflect on the common principles discussed in this chapter to critically 
illustrate how the fee-for-service payment model fares with regard to compliance with 
the basic moral standards in health care. 
 
3.1 Principlism 
Medical students all over the world are taught the four principles approach  
proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (1994) in their seminal work, Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics, which form the basis of what we now commonly refer to 
as ‘principlism’.   They are no less relevant in the payment model debate than 
in any other facet of health care.   The four principles are intended to reflect 
what Beauchamp and Childress call the ‘common morality’ and are therefore 
applicable in all contexts. The principles are: respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. 
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Respect for Autonomy 
Autonomy embodies considerations of informed consent, confidentiality and 
self-determination (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2008: 14).   In addition, 
autonomy could refer equally to the patient as well as the health care provider.   
It seems uncontroversial that patients should in principle not only be informed 
about what health services they receive, but what the cost and value 
implications of such services are.   Only once all the reasonable and necessary 
facts are known to patients could they ever make informed choices whether or 
not to accept the performance of various health services.   This is also clearly 
stipulated by the National Health Act (2003: s 6(1)) where it states that the user 
is to have full knowledge of kind and cost of care that they receive, and should 
be given the right to accept or refuse treatment. 
 
I think it is clear that in health care, precise advance costing is not always 
possible – for example in emergencies, or when unforeseen complications of 
routine services or procedures arise.   What is important, however, is that a 
reasonable attempt should be made to inform patients as accurately as 
possible about the foreseeable costs of current and future services (National 
Health Act 61 of 2003: s 6(1)(c), Health Professions Act 56 of 1974: s 53(1), 
McQuoid-Mason and Dada 2011: 63).   Lastly it is clear that overlap exists 
between the principle of autonomy and legislation designed specifically to 
protect patients – such as the Constitution (1996) and the Consumer 
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Protection Act (2008).   What is less apparent is how the principle of patient 
autonomy and professional autonomy should properly and consistently co-
exist.   It is not unreasonable to appreciate how the variable pull of these two 
forms of autonomy can result in instances of dual loyalty.   In my own 
professional experience, instances where a patient’s wishes oppose the 
expectation of medical professionalism (and the responsibilities this entails) 
are fairly commonplace.   Williams (2009: 8) describes how there are times 
when the responsibilities of the health care provider to two or more such 
external parties mentioned above may appear to be divergent or incompatible.   
A good example of this is where hospital and regional policies are designed 
using utilitarian principles based upon the distribution and sustainability of 
available resources.   In specific instances practitioners can be faced with 
decisions to either comply with the prescriptive mandate by withholding the 
best available care from certain patients, or to provide best available care to 
their patients against prevailing policy because they believe this to be in their 
patients’ best interests (London 2005: 9). 
 
Beneficence 
The principle of ‘doing good’, promoting health and acting in the best interests 
of patients is the second principle central to morally desirable health care 
provision.   While largely intuitive, this principle serves a second function: to 
emphasise that medical practitioners should act in their patients’ best interests 
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even when these are contrary to their own (HPCSA (2) 2008: s 2(3)(2)).   It is 
understandable why the beneficence principle often finds itself at the heart of 
the payment debate.   It is, however, not obvious how the application of 
beneficence simultaneously allows provision for the interests of the health care 
provider.   It could even be argued that a strict interpretation of the beneficence 
principle may minimise the practitioner’s right to fair remuneration in favour of 
providing the best possible care to patients. 
 
Non-maleficence 
Quite simply this refers to the avoidance of harm wherever possible.    It is one 
of the oldest principles of medical ethics, dating back to the Hippocratic Oath.   
In a sense, avoiding harm is probably tightly correlated with proper attention to 
the other three principles, in particular adequate consideration for the well-
being and best interests of patients as described in the beneficence principle 
above, and later in chapter 6. 
 
The principle’s application applies to the payment debate on multiple levels.   
Payment models that encourage over- or under-servicing, hurried 
consultations or poor accountability in care are at risk for non-compliance with 
the non-maleficence principle to the extent that they may not actively 
encourage or select for good medical practice.   It could be argued that any 
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payment system which does not simultaneously align with a patient’s best 
interests runs the risk of failing to provide for this basic moral protection. 
 
Justice 
The justice principle often refers to resource and skills allocation in health care 
- otherwise referred to as distributive justice (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2008: 
15).   In contrast to the first three principles, the evaluation of justice in health 
care applies less to individuals than it does to societies (ibid).   While implicit to 
a proper understanding of the justice principle is that the needs of societies 
emanate directly from those of its individuals, it may be criticised for its 
simultaneously poor application to individual scenarios.   Similarly it could be 
argued that by virtue of their individual patient focus, autonomy, non-
maleficence and beneficence ignore much of the contextual relevance required 
for payment model design. 
 
Commentators have emphasised how policies in health care should prioritise 
the common good, and how commodification poses fundamental ethical 
problems for societies (Pellegrino 1999: 261).   The fee-for-service payment 
model is almost by definition individualistic in design.   As I alluded to in the 
description of autonomy, the model is conceptually designed with the monetary 
value of particular professional services (to individual patients) in mind.   It is 
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
therefore not obvious how fee-for-service addresses principles of justice, and 
especially distributive justice. 
 
3.2 Consequentialism 
This normative ethical theory morally evaluates action or inaction based on 
their consequences, and not on any evaluation of the actual action itself – 
making it an example of a teleological theory2 (Jackson 2013: 10).   For 
consequentialism, actions are neither intrinsically right nor wrong, but are 
judged according to their aggregate outcomes.   It follows that in order to 
evaluate the morality of actions there must be a set of outcomes that are 
morally valued, and others which are less desirable.   In health care well-being 
is such an outcome that consequentialists would say needs to be maximised.   
Furthermore, it is difficult to apply the theory appropriately without first agreeing 
to a method of ranking such outcomes (Jackson 2013:11). 
 
By virtue of the outcome-focused nature of health care, it is unsurprising that 
consequentialist moral theory is a significant influence.   In essence, the 
concept of what is in the best interests of a patient is actually an embodiment 
of a largely consequentialist principle, and a highly-ranked moral outcome.   
                                                     
 
2 In Greek telos means consequences. 
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Interventions are morally evaluated contingent upon promotion of the beneficial 
consequences or best interests of a patient.   Since they are so dependent on 
the best interests’ principle, it could be argued that both beneficence and non-
maleficence are similarly consistent with many aspects of consequentialism. 
 
Interestingly, since consequences can in addition be experienced by 
communities, this theory appears elegantly adapted for application to patient 
populations as well as individuals.   For this reason, consequentialist thinking 
often informs the design of public health policies which aim to promote the 
aggregate good of communities for which they exist (Dhai and McQuoid-
Mason 2008: 11).   To the extent that we assume public policy appropriately 
relies on consequentialism, it seems intuitive that payment model designs 
(essentially a less obvious form of public policy) should also be subjected to a 
similar kind of ‘consequentialist stress-test’.   Later I will illustrate how from a 
consequentialist viewpoint the fee-for-service model tends to favour outcomes 
for medical practitioners above those for patients or patient populations – 
particularly in the South African private practice environment. 
 
3.3 Virtue ethics 
In concert with our traditionally held views on the kind of moral fibre doctors 
ought to have, Aristotle described and prioritised the specific ‘virtues’ of 
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character that are pivotal to the evaluation of what has come to be known as 
virtue ethics (Rachels 2003: 173).   The theory proposes a list of so-called 
moral virtues, and in contrast to consequentialism values the virtuous intent of 
actions preferentially to their actual consequences (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 
2008: 11).   Choosing the right thing for the right reason is central to virtue 
theory because it reflects the moral quality of one’s character (Jackson 2013: 
13). 
 
Particular focus on a moral agent’s character and intent resonates with both a 
traditional interpretation of medicine and the social contract (Cruess et al. 
2000: 1189, Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2008: 2, Williams 2009: 48), as well as 
a modern understanding of medical professionalism (Cruess et al. 2000: 1190, 
Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2008: 2, Swick 2000: 614, Williams 2009: 49).   I 
think it is also fair to assume that society’s commonly held beliefs or 
expectations of the character and conduct of medical professionals seem 
consistently aligned with what virtue ethics would consider as morally 
desirable. 
 
In contrast to principlism (emphasising a patient’s wishes and best interests), 
and consequentialism (preferential value of the aggregate outcome of actions 
independent of their intention), the virtue ethicist might evaluate the intrinsic 
moral worth of a payment model proportional to how effectively it promotes 
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expression of the virtues in both doctor and patient.   Importantly, virtue ethics 
does not consider patient autonomy a moral priority, because the desire to do 
something does not in itself justify the moral worth of the action (Jackson 2013: 
13). 
 
The ethical theories just described commonly find application in actual health 
care scenarios.   In order to prioritise ethical fundamentals in the practice of 
medicine, payment models should probably not deter their continued 
expression.   In preference, such models would actively promote alignment 
with patient-centred moral principles, an appreciation of favourable clinical and 
social consequences and sustained encouragement of virtuous characteristics 
of medical professionals or medical professionalism.   In chapter 7 the fee-for-
service payment model is critically evaluated (amongst others) therefore with 
regard to compliance with the basic moral standards described in this chapter. 
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4. REVIEW OF PERTINENT SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION, GUIDELINES 
AND REGULATIONS 
In this chapter I do not propose a detailed or extensive review of the laws, 
regulations or professional guidelines which pertain to medical practitioners.   Rather 
I have highlighted the most relevant of these to the extent that they potentially inform 
the payment debate.   I first outline applicable core legislation, then briefly discuss 
the National Patients’ Rights Charter and lastly illustrate how they have informed the 
ethical guidelines for good practice and conduct of medical practitioners. 
 
4.1 Legislation 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) affirms 
everyone’s inherent dignity (s 10), their right to have their dignity respected 
and protected (ibid), the right to bodily and psychological integrity, including 
security in and control over their body (s 12(2)(b)) and the right to have access 
to health care services (s 27(1)(a)).   The National Health Act 61 of 2003 by 
definition covers private health care (s 2(a)(1)), and is intended to provide 
uniformity with regard to progressive realisation of the constitutional right of 
access to health care services for all South Africans (s 2(c)(i)).   The Minister of 
Health is responsible for promoting the alignment of health services with the 
country’s socio-economic development plan (s 3(1)(b)), and determining the 
policies and measures necessary to protect, promote, improve and maintain 
the health and well-being for its citizens (s 3 (1)(b)). 
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As already mentioned in the principlism review above, medical practitioners 
are required on request to inform patients of the fee that they intend to charge 
before rendering a professional service (Health Professions Act 1974: s 53(1), 
National Health Act 2003: 6(1)(c)).   They are also required to do so if their fee 
is higher than the usual fee levied for a similar service (ibid).   The Health 
Professions Act governs the Health Professions Council of South Africa, which 
in turn is tasked with the following objectives according to the Act: 
 
 Regulate and promote professional and ethical standards (s 3(m)); 
 Investigate complaints concerning medical practitioners3 and discipline 
contraventions of the Act in order to protect the public (s 3(n)); 
 Ensure that medical practitioners respect a patient’s constitutional rights to 
human dignity, bodily and psychological integrity and equality, and behave 
accordingly (s 3(o)); 
 Guide the profession and protect the public (s 15A(h)). 
 
According to the Consumer Protection Act (no. 68 of 2008), a patient would be 
considered a ‘consumer’, and a medical practitioner a ‘supplier’ (Slabbert and 
                                                     
 
3 While the Act is relevant to all health professionals, for clarity I refer here to the subset of medical 
practitioners. 
 
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Pepper 2011: 800).4   Consumers also appear to be preferentially protected by 
the Act where conflict with other legislation arises (s 4(4)).   The Act is intended 
to promote access to goods and services (s 3(1)(b)), fair business practices (s 
3(1)(c)), and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers by 
encouraging a consumer market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable 
and responsible (s 3(1)(a)).   Section 8 of the Consumer Protection Act 
provides protection to consumers from discrimination or preferential provision 
of services. 
 
While a detailed analysis of these protections is beyond the scope of this 
report, it is interesting to consider what specific implications this section of the 
Act potentially has on particularly capitation payment models, fee-for-service 
and to some extent pay-for-performance arrangements.5   Health services 
                                                     
 
4 I outlined in section 1.1 how equal reference to ‘consumer’ and ‘patient’ carries with it a potentially 
negative connotation of commodification in the health care context.   This particular section refers 
specifically to the Act, and therefore to consumers in the more general interpretation. 
 
5 This is particularly relevant with regard to any variance in access to particular goods and services (s 
8(1)(a)), fees for the same goods and services (s 8(1)(e)), and differences in the quality of goods or 
services provided (s 8(1)(d)).   Legislation does, however, usually ring-fence such provisions thereby 
leaving many others open to legal interpretation.   Discrimination on the basis of race, gender or 
disability for example is specifically provided for in section 9 of the Constitution, Chapter 2 of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (No. 4 of 2000) and section 24 of 
the Medical Schemes Act (No. 131 of 1998: s 24(2)(e)).   Relative access to the range of health care 
services in the private sector according to the financial means of the patient as consumer is probably 
less well provisioned. 
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rendered in the absence of appropriate consent are defined as ‘unsolicited’ by 
the Act (s 21(1)(e)), and a patient is not obliged to pay for such services (s 
21(7)).   Since its promulgation in 2010, the Consumer Protection Act has not 
actually featured prominently in the South African health care context.   Part of 
the reason for this is that the Act makes provision for a consumer court - 
distinct from a court primarily in the limitation of its power (Dinnie 2009: 43).   
Notwithstanding the inclusion of the doctor-patient relationship in the Act, a 
consumer court is therefore relatively limited in its capacity to consider 
complaints which may arise (ibid).   The Act provides that doctors are 
responsible for remedy of any defect incurred, or refunding of their portion of 
the incurred expense (s 54(2)).   In practice, most consumers who suffer 
lasting damages as a result of this relationship are therefore necessarily 
required to seek assistance from common law courts (Dinnie 2009: 44).   This 
would include the recovery of additional costs incurred by the patient in the 
process of such a remedy (ibid). 
 
Finally, the Medical Schemes Act (no. 131 of 1998) represents an attempt to 
improve the public’s access to private health care, and provide some 
protection to members of medical schemes.   In order to prevent unfair 
discrimination, admission to a medical scheme and payment of contributions 
may be conditional upon income and/or number of dependents only, and no 
longer any other grounds such as age, sex or health status (s 29(1)(n)).   The 
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Act gives rise to the Council for Medical Schemes – a juristic body which, 
amongst others, is designed to protect members of medical schemes (s 3(1), s 
7(a)).   The Council must also align the functioning of medical schemes with 
national health policy, recommend quality and outcomes measures for actual 
health provision by medical schemes, investigate complaints and settle 
disputes involving medical schemes and generally identify and distribute 
information about private health care (s 7(b-e), s 16). 
 
As a member of the public, or of a medical scheme, it is difficult to confirm 
exactly how the Council is performing this specific mandate, or how 
adequately.   Neither is relevant feedback regarding the performance of its 
function to protect members within a fee-for-service health care environment is 
easily accessible on the Council’s official web site.   More specifically, the 
official portal does not communicate how the body has “investigated 
complaints” or “settled disputes” involving medical schemes (s 7(d)).   The only 
references are to proposed mandates, but not to how they are carried out, 
what has been achieved, and how successful the Council has been in 
protecting members of medical schemes as required by the Act.   The following 
refers to member protection by the “Complaints Adjudication Unit” – no further 
links, information, resources or results are provided in support of these 
statements: 
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This Unit serves the beneficiaries of medical schemes and 
the general public by investigating and resolving 
complaints and disputes lodged against medical 
schemes.   Amongst other duties, the Unit is also 
responsible for the following:  Monitoring the fair treatment 
of members and ensuring that members have access to 
the benefits provided for in the rules of medical schemes; 
Monitoring compliance with the Medical Schemes Act and 
the registered rules of medical schemes; Providing legal 
certainty and consistency on decisions issued on 
complaints. 
Council for Medical Schemes n.d. 
www.medicalschemes.com/Content.aspx?105 
 
In support of this, an obvious but important problem is that prices of primary 
healthcare providers are simply not regulated (Halse et al 2012: 8).   This, 
together with collapse of the National Reference Health Price List (“NHRPL”), 
contributed to the need for a market-inquiry into pricing of the South African 
private health care sector by the Competition Commission.   One of the 
concerns is that the current standard of independent pricing could be 
coordinated anti-competitive (Halse et al 2012: 9).   The failure by the Council 
for Medical Schemes to provide a regulatory framework for pricing in private 
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health care simultaneously represents a failure to the protect members as 
described above (Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998: s 3(1), s 7(a)). 
 
Regulation 8 of the Medical Schemes Act represents a further ethical and 
practical challenge to the fee-for-service environment (Act 131 of 1998: Reg. 
8).   According to s 8(1) of the Regulations, the diagnosis and treatment of the 
prescribed minimum benefit (PMB) conditions should be covered in full (no co-
payments by members are provisioned) regardless of the benefit options being 
offered by the scheme.   PMB conditions include for example diabetes mellitus, 
hypertension, asthma and a list of others outlined in Annexure A of the 
Regulations.   Any emergency medical condition is also considered a PMB 
condition (Act 131 of 1998: Reg. 7).   The loophole afforded by this Regulation 
provides temptation for health care providers operating in a fee-for-service 
environment to charge more for services rendered for PMB conditions in 
comparison to other conditions.   Either way it seems that an ethical and legal 
conundrum exists, for if it were not mandatory for medical schemes to cover 
PMB claims in full, practitioners charging more than a scheme’s re-
imbursement rate would necessarily trigger a co-payment liability for the 
patient.   While this scenario impacts negatively on patients in one respect, it 
represents a somewhat more financially predictable model for medical 
schemes, and savings could presumably be passed on to members in the form 
of reduced contribution premiums.   Regulation 8 as it stands, however, 
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exposes medical schemes to over-servicing and over-charging for PMB 
conditions. 
 
4.2 National Patients’ Rights Charter 
The Patients’ Rights Charter recognises that as citizens we have the right to 
participate in our own health-decisions (autonomy principle), and in health care 
policy development (Department of Health 1999: s 2(2)).   Our rights to access 
to health care include being treated with courtesy, patience, empathy and 
tolerance by a health care provider displaying a positive disposition consistent 
with respect for our human dignity (Department of Health 1999: s 2(3)(f)).   We 
have a right to choose our health care provider or health facility (Department of 
Health 1999: s 2(5)), to complain about the health care service received and 
receive comprehensive feedback after such complaints have been investigated 
(Department of Health 1999: s 2(12)).   Patients have a responsibility to 
investigate the cost of their health care and make appropriate arrangements 
for payment (Department of Health 1999: s 3(9)). 
 
4.3 Guidelines for Good Practice 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) provides some 
general guidance on the payment debate.   The guidelines emphasises many 
of the core ethical values and principles such as autonomy, beneficence, non-
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maleficence and justice mentioned in chapter 3 above (HPCSA (2) 2008: s 
2(3)).   Very early on in the guidelines practitioners are advised to avoid over-
servicing, declare relevant financial interests and prioritise the clinical need of 
a patient above other factors (HPCSA (2) 2008: s 5(8), HPCSA (3) 2008: s 
1(1))).   They are also required to avoid providing unnecessary services and to 
“refrain from…participating in improper financial arrangements, especially 
those that escalate costs and disadvantage individuals or institutions unfairly” 
(HPCSA (2) 2008: s 9(1)). 
 
In general, a medical practitioner should avoid any form of remuneration or 
benefit which induces him to under-service, over-charge, over-service, act 
unprofessionally or perform acts which are not medically indicated. 
(Government Gazette 2006: s 7(3)).   The clinical need of patients is the 
medical practitioner’s priority.   Any inducements or incentives which threaten 
professional autonomy, professional independence or compliance with a 
medical practitioner’s ethical rules and policies are therefore not permitted 
(HPCSA (1) 2008: s 1(1), HPCSA (3) 2008: s 1(2)).   “Over-servicing of any 
kind is unacceptable” (HPCSA (1) 2008: s 1(1)).   In any capitation, 
prepayment or similar risk-sharing arrangement there should be peer review, 
practice profiling and a comprehensive utilisation review in order to avoid 
under-servicing (HPCSA (1) 2005: s 4(15)).   In booklet 5 health care 
practitioners are disallowed from both the receipt and offering of commission 
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on goods, substances and materials (HPCSA (3) 2008: s 3(9)).   Difficulty 
arises because health practitioners are entitled to charge a mark-up fee on 
many goods, substances and materials that they utilise in the rendering of 
health care.   I would argue that this effectively represents commission in an 
alternative form – i.e. the more consumables invoiced, for example, the greater 
the income from such consumables.   The additional “fee-for-goods” received 
may induce practitioners to purchase and utilise (effectively selling) such 
goods, substances and materials in excess of the reasonable need to do so in 
order to maximise profit.   This is therefore not logically distinct from the ethical 
difficulties encountered with fee-for-service generally.6 
  
                                                     
 
6 Receiving and sharing in fees from professional partners and associates is permitted in section 
10(3) of booklet 5 (HPCSA (3) 2008).   In a similar way to the commission example just outlined, 
practitioners could induce partners within a private practice to over-service in order to maximise both 
personal and shared profits.   The author has observed this practice amongst medical associates on 
multiple occasions. 
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
5. MORAL TENETS OF AN IDEAL PAYMENT MODEL 
I have outlined some basic moral theories, which inform health care and more 
specifically some fundamental moral principles involved in private practitioner 
remuneration.   I have also provided a brief overview of the pertinent regulatory 
environment in which South African doctors provide health care services.   I will now 
sketch the background of medical professionalism and the social contract before 
proposing an integration of the basic moral tenets already discussed in a way that 
could inform moral evaluation of health care payment models.   Later I specifically 
apply these consolidated principles to the formulation of a kind of moral blueprint 
against which payment models in general could be morally evaluated. 
 
5.1 Background – the social contract 
Health professionals have traditionally pursued their profession according to 
the terms of an unwritten, relatively unstructured yet commonly accepted 
understanding or contract with the societies in which they have lived and 
worked (Cruess et al. 2000: 1189).   It has been characterised by a specific, 
but implicit relationship between the role of doctors and society where in return 
for personal sacrifice, service, altruism and the pursuit of medical knowledge 
health providers were given financial reward, status and privileges such as the 
right to self-regulation and professional autonomy (ibid). 
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The two parties in this traditional form of the social contract had relatively well 
defined roles: physicians devote time and effort towards gathering and 
furthering medical knowledge and skill, and use such attributes to assist with 
healing individuals within societies and the serving of society in general.   In 
order to perform these functions effectively they are required to display a 
strong sense of morality, commitment to the public good and a developed 
sense of altruism (Williams 2009: 48). 
 
Many have argued that the concept of a medical practitioner’s autonomy and 
the patient’s best interests are necessarily interdependent (Emanuel and 
Pearson 2012: 368).   In order to encourage physician autonomy a move away 
from fee-for-service is necessary, and would almost certainly entail a 
modification in the way that they practice (ibid).7  By operating relatively 
autonomously within privileged or less prescriptive occupational oversight it is 
necessary for doctors to develop a system of self-governance (Williams 2009: 
48). 
 
                                                     
 
7 Autonomy in the professional sense implies a certain freedom with which professions self-govern 
and professional decisions are made.   The social contract assumes a significant degree of 
professional autonomy to be in the best interests of the patient.   What Emanuel and Pearson are 
implying is that fee-for-service effectively erodes such autonomy by rendering service conditional 
upon a fee, rather than solely the product of professionalism. 
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Society in turn holds physicians in high regard – a position that is arguably 
deserved given the extent of their studies, privileged knowledge base and the 
high moral standards required of them (Schei and Cassell: 2012).   A 
significant degree of trust characterises the unspoken contract (Anderson 
1995: 413).   This is particularly necessary given the vulnerability that patients 
often experience in health care (ibid).    The characteristics and the moral 
obligations assumed of them mean that medical practitioners are subject to a 
code of accepted behaviour which embodies these elements (Cruess et al. 
2000: 1189).   Today we could equate this to the concept of professionalism 
(ibid).   This is succinctly described in the following extract: 
 
… (Medical) professionalism consists of those behaviours by 
which we—as physicians—demonstrate that we are worthy of 
the trust bestowed upon us by our patients and the public, 
because we are working for the patients’ and the public’s good. 
              (Swick 2000: 614) 
 
The notion of professionalism has essentially been accepted as the basic 
foundation of the social contract (Cruess et al. 2000: 1190).   Central to 
professionalism is that it implies a set of moral obligations to both patients and 
their communities (Swick 2000: 616).   Furthermore, despite the dramatic 
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changes experienced by all professions in the modern era, the social contract 
and professionalism remain as pivotal today as they were thousands of years 
ago (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason 2008: 2). 
 
Professionalism, however, is less obvious in health care today.   The current 
trend towards technical- and knowledge-focused, transactional health provision 
has probably shifted some of the focus away from the physician’s respected 
and central moral role in historical communities.   Some argue that a new kind 
of independent ‘health care entrepreneur’ has emerged who values the 
commercial aspects of their profession over professionalism (Williams 2009: 
49). 
 
I would contend that this change represents a structurally flawed and logical 
disconnect between two necessarily interdependent concepts.   The 
progressive changes we have observed in the health professional’s thinking 
seem at odds with, and in relative isolation to the society which they are 
designed to serve.   In a sense, professionals have tried to re-define 
themselves independently of the social contexts, which defined them in the first 
place (Cruess et al. 2000: 1190).   If the very contract which professionals have 
always granted tacit consent to exists for the purposes of serving such 
societies, then a correction towards a more traditional contract seems likely or 
even inevitable.   It follows that any such correction would necessarily entail a 
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strengthening of professionalism: a core principle from which the social 
contract derives its meaning. 
 
5.2 The basic tenets 
The payment debate in private practice is in many respects analogous to a 
balance of power.   Too much control over a payment model by medical 
practitioners potentially weakens the realisation of patients’ best interests.   Too 
much in the hands of patients could potentially both discourage doctors and 
render health care unprofitable.   Excess influence by health insurers exposes 
the industry to real risk of significant paternalism.   Ideally, the locus of control 
for payment in health care should probably be as equally balanced as possible 
to provide for the interests of all concerned.   In real terms, during a medical 
consultation the practitioner should (by whatever specific mechanism) have the 
patients’ best interests in the forefront of his mind, and be discouraged or 
unable to manipulate expected remuneration at either the patient’s or their 
health insurer’s expense. 
 
One of the main assumptions on which this research is based is that the best 
interests of a patient should be prioritised in some way during the health care 
delivery process.   In application to payment model design, it should therefore 
be clear how central the role of principlism ought to be in the process.   I have 
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shown how professionalism is critical to the provision of appropriate health 
care.   It would therefore be desirable and beneficial for payment models in 
private practice to not only preserve, but encourage medical professionalism.   
This is arguably the most difficult tenet to successfully achieve.   With the 
introduction of fee-for-service, the potential for over-servicing and therefore the 
interests of some medical practitioners – unlike in the social contract – are not 
always consistent with medical professionalism (see also footnote 5 above).   
Unless the interests of a practitioner could in some way be connected to or 
aligned with medical professionalism, both professional autonomy and the 
patient’s best interests are potentially threatened.   Concerns about autonomy 
have been raised with the introduction of a pay-for-performance arrangement 
(Saint-Lary et al. 2012: 487), as well as any transactional-based model, such 
as fee-for-service (Australia Productivity Commission 2008: 97).   Lastly, 
(notwithstanding some ethical criticisms already raised) on a purely technical 
basis payment models are required by law to comply with pertinent regulations 
and professional guidelines. 
 
In summary, the basic tenets that I have proposed are: 
 Consider the best interests of the patient 
 Encourage medical professionalism 
 Comply with pertinent regulations and professional guidelines 
 Balance locus of control between all parties 
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5.3 Sustainability 
In order to meet its principle objectives, this research purposefully neglects 
rigorous examination of any payment model’s specific application or actual 
consequences.   Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that any proposed 
and viable payment model should probably be consistent with economic 
sustainability of the specific health context to which it applies.   I have already 
indicated why a sustainable private health insurance industry is necessary.   
For its sustained acceptance and application, the proposed moral 
fundamentals of any payment model should also be robust and conceptually 
compatible.   A definitive evaluation of the various economic considerations 
that a model should address are, however, beyond the scope of this report. 
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6. THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATE PRACTICE ENVIRONMENT 
This report has outlined the background, the moral context and regulatory 
environment of the payment debate in South Africa.   In order to appropriately 
evaluate the fee-for-service model in South Africa, this chapter first highlights some 
of the basic features that characterise the local private practice environment.   I have 
broken these down into general context, remuneration, the relevant parties’ best 
interests and governance-related features. 
 
6.1 General context 
For the purposes of a properly contextualised discussion, I propose the 
following general assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1 
Medical practitioners in private practice invoice for particular medical goods 
(consumable items such as medicines and materials) and services 
(consultations and medical or surgical procedures).   A specific service is 
generally assigned a monetary value dependent on (1) the medical 
practitioner’s speciality, and (2) the average time an equivalently qualified 
specialist would spend on a similar service. 
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Assumption 2 
Within a particular speciality, the monetary value of medical services is not 
meaningfully correlated with a practitioner’s overall experience, effectiveness 
or any other intrinsic variable with regard to either the majority of cash-paying 
(or so-called ‘private’) patients, or many of their medical insurers;8 
 
Assumption 3 
The majority of medical practitioners’ annual consultation fee increases are 
inflation-dependent.   Medical inflation is more than double the rate of general 
inflation in most countries, averaging 7.9% in 2013 (Towers Watson 2014: 1).    
South Africa’s medical costs increased by 8.4% and 8.1% on average in 2012 
and 2013 respectively, compared to general inflation of 5.7% and 5.8% for the 
same periods (Towers Watson 2014: 5). 
 
 
                                                     
 
8 Medical insurers are increasingly negotiating payment contracts with doctors which propose fees 
contingent upon compliance with a number of pre-determined management criteria (example), and 
less often upon clinical outcomes relative to a pre-determined benchmark.   This increasingly applies 
to the management of patients who suffer from chronic medical conditions such as hypertension and 
diabetes. 
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6.2 Remuneration 
A few important points follow from the above assumptions, and in turn inform a 
more detailed analysis of how medical practitioners in private practice 
characteristically earn their income.   It is necessary to delineate and 
accurately conceptualise this process insofar as it provides necessary insight 
into the conditions best suited for the interests of private medical practitioners.   
This provides the basis for comparison to the best interests of both patients 
and health insurers, which is in turn fundamental for the moral evaluation of 
fee-for-service payment. 
 
If we assume fees to be on average fairly standardised within a speciality, the 
relative variable most predictive of a doctor’s turnover would simply be the 
number of invoices raised i.e. the number of patients seen.9   Within the same 
private practice it would therefore be possible for a doctor in the first year of 
their career, for example, to generate a similar professional turnover to an 
equivalently qualified, but far more experienced doctor.   This would be 
possible by simply by raising an equivalent number of invoices. 
 
                                                     
 
9 There are obviously exceptions to this generalisation, but a comparison between doctors in similar 
specialities performing a similar range and mix of professional tasks has been assumed. 
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Now consider the medical practitioner who attempts to increase their relative 
earnings.   It is clear that this could usually only be achieved by: 
 Increasing the number of patients seen;10 
 Increasing the consultation fee above general and medical inflation; 
 Increasing the number of chargeable items (or the fees for such 
items) per consultation; or 
 Reducing practice spend on fixed costs, consumable items and 
services.11 
 
Some important corollaries also flow from the thread of this discussion.   Firstly, 
in order for a medical practitioner to accommodate more bookings in a day he 
would need to: 
 Shorten consultations; 
 Over-book his diary; or 
 Work longer hours. 
 
                                                     
 
10 This should be understood in terms of a volume / time ratio, for example patients seen per day. 
 
11 Importantly, this could possibly have implications for the overall quality of the health service 
rendered. 
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Secondly, in order for any of these strategies to be productive, there would 
need to be sufficient demand to provide the required volume of patients: a 
variable that is not in the practitioner’s immediate control.   In South Africa a 
relative excess of patients exists since the overall demand for health care 
(including private practice) exceeds the relative supply of medical practitioners 
(Breier 2008: ).12   This is not therefore a limiting factor in South Africa. 
 
6.3 Parties’ best interests 
I have reviewed some basic moral theories, which inform health care generally, 
and how they could theoretically apply to the moral fundamentals of an ideal 
payment model.   While some of what follows may be considered self-evident, 
for clarity I will now describe what I would consider are broadly speaking the 
best interests of patients, medical practitioners and health insurers.   This is 
instructive as it provides the much of the applied basis of the critical discussion 
of fee-for-service which follows in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
12 A recognised shortage of medical practitioners exists in South Africa: average of 7 medical 
practitioners per 10 000 population versus 28:10 000 in developed (high-income) countries (Breier 
2008: 13). 
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Best interests of patients 
Patients ideally require timeous and accurate diagnosis as well as effective 
and efficient care.   This may entail the performance of special investigations, 
specialist intervention/s and the best available treatment – usually from a 
skilled medical practitioner.   A number of ancillary conditions are important 
such as being treated appropriately and with the dignity and sensitivity which 
promotes comfort and confidence.   This necessarily includes attention to the 
psychological and emotional needs of patients.   Sufficient consultation time, 
health promotion and follow-up planning are also in the patient’s best interests.   
I would collectively summarise the above as effective care. 
 
While it may seem obvious that the best effective care is desired by most 
patients, it is not possible in my opinion to exclude the financial cost of health 
care for patients in private practice from an appreciation of what constitutes 
their best interests.   Health insurers and public health care services are also 
necessarily subject to this cost variable.   For this reason, the best effective 
care may not necessarily be accessible or available to either the patient, health 
insurer or health service.   In summary, I would therefore propose that what is 
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reasonably in a patient’s best interests is the most effective, available care 
which the patient can afford.13 
 
Best interests of health insurers 
Health insurers have a technically difficult task with regard to protecting their 
best interests.   This is largely because their best interests entail simultaneous 
attention to four principal and equally powerful mandates. 
 
Firstly, health insurers are required to provide an effective service to their 
members.   Health insurers therefore share many of the same interests as 
those of the patients they insure.   They are particularly cost-conscious to 
maintain the lowest effective average premium costs for their population of 
members in order that they remain competitive to rival insurers.   Secondly, 
health insurers are under pressure to provide sufficient incentive (agreed 
remuneration) for medical practitioners to encourage their continued 
                                                     
 
13 I concede that this is probably controversial, and potentially problematic.   Ideally, a fair price is 
obviously a better option compared to an inferior service.   The difficulty is that this line of argument 
threatens the concept of private practice entirely.   Firstly, the price of a service is presumably the 
price at which such a service has been determined to be sustainable by the private provider.   
Secondly, it is difficult to imagine how concessions on the price of services on this basis could 
simultaneously avoid a slippery slope ending in health cover for all.   This would effectively represent 
an abolishment of private practice altogether.   Private practice is therefore by definition characterised 
by the relative affordability of health care services. 
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collaboration.   Thirdly, compliance with a variety of stringent, and periodically 
changing industry regulations is mandatory.   Lastly, the health insurer must 
successfully fulfil the above mandates while remaining an economically viable 
business concern. 
 
Best interests of medical practitioners14 
Professional decision-making assumes a degree of professional autonomy.   
To the degree that specific clinical decision-making and interventions are 
appropriate or indicated, medical practitioners would presumably benefit from 
maximum professional autonomy to arrive at such decisions.   Unlike in a more 
traditional society influenced by the social contract, medical practitioners today 
have increasingly become sole proprietors, or health care entrepreneurs 
(Williams 2009: 49).   In this situation, it would be in a medical practitioner’s 
best interests to levy maximum professional fees for services in order to 
prosper financially. 
 
In terms of contractual agreements with health insurers, practitioners would 
presumably once again benefit from a liberal degree of professional autonomy.   
                                                     
 
14 I have avoided describing predictable extremes such as ‘no accountability’, or ‘minimum time spent 
at work’ etc.   A realistic view given the prevailing professional medical environment has been 
assumed. 
Dr Gregory Green 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
In addition, many professionals prefer to reserve the option to supersede 
contractual boundaries where it is deemed professionally or morally necessary.   
The interpretation or application of the terms of contracts would presumably be 
those best suited to maximise income. 
 
Less obvious conditions which might be in the best interests of many medical 
practitioners could include: 
 
 Adequate perceived income and perceived growth in future income; 
 Adequate job satisfaction, perceived professional growth and future job 
satisfaction; 
 Limited personal accountability for provision of poor quality health care; 
 Limited administrative and regulatory burden. 
 
In summary, while patients require effective, cost-effective care, the best 
interests of medical practitioners in private practice are not obviously similarly 
aligned.   Health insurers have the technically challenging task of 
simultaneously providing for the interests of both patients and medical 
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practitioners.   It is evident that unless alternative conditions exist15, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that in some circumstances fee-for-service payment 
could inherently promote under-servicing with respect to effective care, and 
over-servicing with respect to the relative cost of health care.   I will attend to 
this argument in more detail after a brief review of governance in private 
practice. 
 
6.4 Governance 
Major political change in South Africa in the 1990s was followed by the promise 
of an actively reforming health system to provide necessary redress for the 
shortcomings of traditional apartheid health care (Coovadia et al. 2009: 817).   
Not only have specific health care-related goals failed, but there has also been 
relatively ineffective governance in the post-apartheid era (Coovadia et al. 
2009: 820). 
                                                     
 
15 It is probably unfair to simply include all medical practitioners in this fairly generalised context.   It is 
obviously true for example that many practitioners share interests which do align with those of their 
patients or health insurers.   These may include the desire to help or support their patients above 
other considerations such as time or remuneration.   Many practitioners are also sensitive to cost 
considerations, and attempt to assist their patients wherever they can.   Rather than discount the 
possibility that many such practitioners exist, I’ve attempted to illustrate how the fee-for-service 
payment model – as a model – may not necessarily encourage these characteristics.   Practitioners 
who provide health care from a more sensitive perspective therefore do so relatively independently of 
the influence of fee-for-service payment model.   I will attend to this again in my critical evaluation of 
fee-for-service. 
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In the current private practice environment, in addition to relatively weak 
regulatory oversight there is, in addition, arguably a paucity of effective 
governance with respect to the quality of health care rendered by medical 
practitioners.16   Medical practitioners in private practice do not, for example, 
usually undergo any form of regular ‘performance appraisal’, ‘management 
review’ or ‘efficiency audit’.   A relatively basic continuing professional 
development system administered by the HPCSA is the only proactive, 
regulatory program which addresses this issue – and only indirectly so.   
Compliance does not involve any kind of review of actual patient care. 
 
In fact it does not seem to be the regulatory bodies which are primarily 
promoting good clinical practice, but the private health insurers.   Interestingly, 
such encouragement is usually in the form of the inherent variable to which 
fee-for-service is most sensitive: differential medical practitioner remuneration.   
It is beyond the scope of this report to analyse why the quality of medical care 
has thus far not been effectively evaluated or constructively utilised to promote 
better care.   Briefly, I would propose that health care is probably both difficult 
to quantify and the relative success of interventions not always easily 
evaluated.   Secondly, an under-supply of medical practitioners probably 
simultaneously represents a relatively unbalanced negotiating advantage in 
                                                     
 
16 Author’s note from exposure to the private practice environment. 
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comparison to patients, health insurers and administrators for any kind of 
discussion on medical practitioner accountability. 
 
While these assumptions might suggest that health care and therefore 
governance are difficult to evaluate, in itself this does not represent a 
convincing argument for why they should not be evaluated at all.   Health care 
evaluation is simply necessary for health care governance and the promotion 
of good medical practice.   In a society where patients’ interests are important, 
a failure in good governance is therefore inevitably a failure to actively promote 
patients’ best interests.   The next chapter evaluates the fee-for-service 
payment model in the context of the private practice environment and the 
moral fundamentals of health care. 
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7. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
I will now critically evaluate the fee-for-service model against the criteria and 
principles thus far developed in order to defend the thesis that the fee-for-service 
payment model is morally unjustified.   To do so I will rely on many of the 
assumptions outlined, including many of those pertaining to the South African private 
practice environment described in chapter 6.   Later I consider some relevant 
difficulties with alternative payment models before proposing how this research could 
be constructively utilised in the design of more morally robust future payment 
models. 
 
7.1 Moral weaknesses of the fee-for-service model 
I have described some features of the private practice environment which 
inform the payment debate, and particularly those pertinent to the evaluation of 
fee-for-service.   Earlier in the report I outlined some of the more influential 
moral principles and theories in health care, and applied them to what could be 
considered the desired fundamentals of any payment model.   I will now 
highlight the weaknesses of the fee-for-service model by comparing its 
compliance with these moral fundamentals.   In conclusion I will argue that the 
fee-for-service model for remuneration of medical practitioners in private 
practice is morally unjustified. 
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Principlism 
It’s critical to once again emphasise that the principle objective of this research 
is whether the fee-for-service model, as a model, inherently promotes or fails 
to promote a patients’ best interests.   It is not unreasonable to assume that 
fee-for-service could promote the best interests of patients under certain 
conditions.   I will indicate in the next section however, that in such situations 
patients’ interests are promoted as a function of both market conditions and the 
fee-for-service payment model, and not necessarily by virtue of the attributes 
of the payment model alone. 
 
I think it is clear when considered independent of relative market conditions, 
there is probably little in the design of the fee-for-service model which 
inherently promotes either the best interests of patients (beneficence, non-
maleficence and respect for autonomy), or justice.   I think it is also clear that it 
neither discourages these basic health care principles.   Besides possibly 
fulfilling the minimum criteria of enabling remuneration by a patient or health 
insurer at all, in the absence of other compelling arguments it is difficult to 
appreciate how the model inherently promotes medical professionalism, the 
best possible patient care, an active avoidance of harm or the consideration of 
a broader context and distributive justice. 
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Consequentialism 
It could be argued that the motivation medical practitioners have to retain 
patients for repeat business makes the fee-for-service arrangement particularly 
effective in a competitive environment (generous supply of medical 
practitioners who compete for patients).   The desire or need to retain patients 
could promote better quality health care, which in turn results in promotion of a 
patient’s best interests (beneficial consequences). 
 
While this is certainly difficult to dispute, the benefits just described are more 
the result of the specific context in which fee-for-service finds itself rather than 
a result of any specific benefits inherent to the model, as a model.   In fact as I 
have already argued, the South African environment is one example of a 
context in which similar market factors are not always experienced.   Contrary 
to the potential benefits that characterise fee-for-service in a generous “supply” 
market, the model is not inherently geared to promote beneficial consequences 
for patients in one which experiences an “under-supply” of medical 
practitioners.   Rather, markets such as these rely on some form of oversight or 
regulation in order to monitor whether medical practitioners conduct their 
practices in alignment with promotion of beneficial consequences for their 
patients in preference to promotion of their own.   In conclusion, fee-for-service 
does not inherently promote beneficial consequences for patients as a model 
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in a way that would morally comply with the basic requirements of 
consequentialism. 
 
Virtue Theory 
I proposed earlier how a modern understanding of what it means to be a 
‘virtuous’ medical practitioner is probably most closely approximated by the 
concept of medical professionalism.   I have also described the parallels of 
modern professionalism with the traditional social contract.   In application to 
fee-for-service, in a manner similar to the arguments just outlined for 
consequentialism, I concede that in specific environments (for example relative 
over-supply of practitioners) the relative virtue of practitioners may appear to 
be encouraged. 
 
Once again though I would argue that any apparent promotion of medical 
professionalism cannot be reliably separated from the accidental 
environmental context in which the model finds itself.   This is again quite 
simply because the fee-for-service model does not promote medical 
professionalism in an under-supply environment, but rather it’s opposite.   In 
support of this I refer to the review of the best interests of the relevant parties 
where I showed how the interests of patients and practitioners are often poorly 
aligned.   It is therefore difficult to justify the existence of a virtuous medical 
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practitioner - one who complies with the values of medical professionalism – in 
any fee-for-service environment on the basis of the attributes of the model.   
Rather, medical practitioners who embody a strong sense of professionalism 
probably do so on the basis of characteristics independent of the fee-for-
service model and largely inherent to themselves. 
 
I conclude, therefore, that there is little evidence that the fee-for-service model 
for private practitioner remuneration inherently promotes the basic features of 
three examples of ethical theories on which health care is grounded – namely 
principlism, consequentialism or virtue ethics. 
 
7.2 Fee-for-service and the regulatory environment 
In the absence of features which actively promote the best interests of 
patients, the fee-for-service model is heavily reliant on the prevailing regulatory 
context to ensure the protection of patients.   Earlier I highlighted some basic 
regulations, legislation and good practice directives which are principally 
designed to protect patients’ interests.   It was also mentioned in chapter 4 that 
despite the Medical Schemes Act (no. 131 of 1998), gaps exist in the 
regulation of private health care in South Africa.    A detailed review of how the 
regulatory framework protects or fails to protect the patient in this context is 
beyond the scope of this report.   Even if it could be argued that the regulatory 
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framework was adequately adapted to providing for such protection, based on 
personal professional experience effective governance in South African health 
care is often, however, relatively weak.   While such observations are not 
materially contributory for the main purpose of this study, I think they illustrate 
how in addition to being morally problematic, fee-for-service arguably operates 
in a weakly administered, and relatively reactive regulatory environment.   This 
effectively represents a potential double blow for both promotion and protection 
of patients’ best interests. 
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8. A PROPOSED MORAL CHECKLIST: PRE-CONDITIONS FOR PAYMENT 
MODEL DESIGN 
It should be clear that what is being suggested in this research is not a substitution of 
existing criteria which define payment systems in private practice.   Nor does the 
scope of this report address the question of ‘what’ or ‘how much’ doctors should be 
paid.   Rather, I have attempted to describe the fundamental basis of ‘how’ 
practitioners are remunerated, and the ethical problems we face when examining 
‘why’ they should be paid in this way at all. 
 
It should also be clear why the research has purposefully not considered other 
contingent factors which are obviously relevant to payment model design.   These 
might include for example public policy, budget and various clinical and practice-
related technicalities.   Insofar as none of these substantially inform a description of 
the desired and common ethic of an essential doctor-patient encounter, they 
therefore cannot similarly inform the ideal moral standard against which payment 
arrangements for such an encounter can be measured.   It should not be understood 
though that such contingent factors are unimportant.   Nor should it follow that the 
integration of these contingencies as practical necessities in payment model design 
necessarily jeopardises the moral worth of the model as a whole.   What does follow 
though is that excluding contingent practicalities from the formation of a moral 
standard has the effect of independently highlighting whatever moral weaknesses 
there may be inherent to a payment model being evaluated. 
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What I have also attempted to show is how the fee-for-service payment model in 
particular, and payment models in general, can be morally evaluated based on how 
they influence the doctor-patient relationship.   In some way an overview of the 
foregoing discussion reads not unlike a kind of moral checklist.   It seems only 
intuitive therefore to now outline the main findings in the form of a proposed moral 
blueprint against which any current or future payment model can be tested. 
 
8.1 A proposed moral checklist 
Given the prevailing socio-economic and regulatory environment, does the 
structural design of a payment model: 
 
 Discourage over- or under-servicing? 
 Promote the interests of patients, providers and the community? 
 Promote medical professionalism by recognising effective and 
appropriate health care? 
 Promote accountability by discouraging sub-optimal health care? 17 
 Comply with pertinent regulations? 
 
                                                     
 
17 I think of this as a ‘skin in the game’ or ‘accountability’ clause. 
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I would like to propose an additional, moderating standard similar to one often 
applied in law.   Judgements often reflect not only on the facts of a matter and 
whether or not they comply with the law, but also on their compliance with what 
is in the spirit of the law.   Similarly I would propose that the design of any 
payment model should ideally be consistent with the spirit of health care.   
Payment models which by and large comply with the conditions proposed here 
are unlikely to require the application of this last moral ‘standard’.   In such 
instances, though, there is little harm in subjecting them to an additional moral 
test.   Models which cannot comply for whatever reasons or limitations might, 
however, be rationally sanctioned merely as a consequence of such reasons or 
limitations.   Reflecting on whether such models are consistent with the spirit of 
health care elegantly and quickly illustrates any generally understood deviation 
from it.   While I would agree that it is open to fairly wide interpretation, the 
simple, intuitive and overriding nature of this last condition is simultaneously 
difficult to ignore.   I believe that discussion generated during reflection on this 
basic principle could have a morally grounding effect that is arguably more 
beneficial on balance for patients’ best interests than it is likely to be restrictive 
to the same because of latitude with respect to its specific interpretation.   The 
last check then: 
 
 Comply with the spirit of health care? 
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8.2 Application and extensions 
A moral checklist like the one proposed means little unless it can be both 
endorsed by the relevant parties and find practical application in informing 
policy design and implementation.   I therefore encourage the assembly of an 
independent ethics body to continually evaluate and modify for endorsement 
both (1) the proposed moral checklist presented here, as well as (2) the moral 
basis of existing and planned payment models. 
 
The role of such a group could be thought of as analogous to that of a 
standard research ethics committee.   In both instances the body endeavours 
to maintain compliance with ethical standards while simultaneously protect the 
best interests of patients, medical practitioners and the community.   Such an 
ethics body should be represented by independent practitioner associations 
(IPAs), Department of Health and/or the HPCSA, members of the general 
public, health insurers and ethicists. 
 
8.3 Implications for communities 
Robust public policies consider not only community outcomes, but also how 
individual community members can be affected by their widespread policy 
implementation.   While I concede that payment policies cannot exclusively be 
modelled around the moral interests of patients, the converse notion that they 
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be modelled exclusively around clinical and economic outcomes seems 
equally untenable.   The principal advantage of any model that prioritises the 
patient’s best interest side-by-side with economic, clinical benefit and other 
practical and policy considerations is its degree of inherent moral control.   I 
think it is clear from this report that our current payment policy in South Africa 
is not similarly ring-fenced by equivalent moral protections. 
 
I acknowledge that in many countries or societies it may be impractical to 
adopt a payment model which fully complies with similar moral requirements to 
those proposed in this report.   Similarly, it may be economically impractical for 
many to even properly scrutinize their existing models with a view to adopting 
change.   The payment systems of such societies’ health care services could 
therefore not always be informed by a similar moral influence and 
consequently enjoy a similar degree of inherent moral control. 
 
In light of the foregoing, it would be incumbent upon and achievable for such 
policymakers to disclose to patients (1) why these adopted conditions cannot 
be adequately met, and (2) what specific weaknesses such omissions expose.   
They would then be required to (3) encourage awareness of what potential 
negative implications this could have during consultations with private 
practitioners, as well as (4) practical ways to recognise and manage these 
effectively.   This would be morally required in order to enable citizens and 
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providers to utilise private health care services with the best possible degree of 
autonomy. 
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9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main limitation of the study is that it doesn’t propose a comprehensive, viable 
alternative to the current remuneration model.   The current report also gives 
relatively little attention to the other principal payment models – particularly pay-for-
performance, which currently attracts favour in for example many developed 
countries.   The patient-centred nature of the review means that applicability to 
actual processes, holistic public policies, populations and outcomes is not 
adequately discussed.   Furthermore, the actual mechanics of how the moral 
principles outlined can be effectively and seamlessly applied to actual payment 
systems has also not been adequately examined.   For these reasons, the study’s 
general applicability to actual health models is not described, and the purpose or 
utility of the research might be questioned.   Precisely because this research does 
not (extend to a description of or describe) any morally viable payment models in 
preference to the fee-for service system, the report is unclear on whether payment 
policies ought to do away with fee-for-service entirely.    
 
In response I would argue however that the criticisms proposed above in fact 
simultaneously highlight the study’s greatest strength: a purely ethical enquiry that is 
not influenced by the practicalities of actual systems, their economics, sustainability 
or specific valued outcomes.   Rather than negate the utility of our existing payment 
model, this research effectively highlights how it might currently value economics, 
outcomes and the practitioner’s interests above professionalism and the best 
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interests of the patient.   This should have the positive effect of inviting constructive 
debate and discussion for informing more relevant and morally acceptable payment 
models in the future. 
 
It could be argued that this research has not focused sufficiently on the role of the 
health insurer as an integral component of the payment debate.   I have attempted, 
where relevant, to illustrate where consideration of health insurance is necessary as 
it informs the moral basis for a critique of fee-for-service.   Extension beyond such 
applications is both beyond the scale of this report, and potentially inconsistent with 
its principal aims.   I would argue that one of the weaknesses of existing systems is 
the apparent paucity of such constructive (particularly moral) discussion which 
informed their design.   It is possible that their almost ‘accidental’ evolution and lack 
of robust moral rationale is probably correlated in some way to their degree of 
success or failure, and probably also their ultimate sustainability in the context of the 
communities in which they apply. 
 
In highlighting the weaknesses of a payment model it should not be inferred that 
each component of the model is unusable.   While I have argued fee-for-service is 
probably morally flawed, it is unreasonable to conclude that each component of the 
model must necessarily be similarly flawed.   On the contrary, I would argue that 
many of the components of fee-for-service are actually very useful.   For one, the 
concept of health care as a ‘service’ is well captured by the model.   Service implies 
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that in some way patients are ‘consumers’ or ‘users’ of health care, and doctors are 
‘providers’.   This interpretation is relatively congruent with the Patients’ Rights 
Charter (Department of Health: 1999), the Constitution (1996), the National Health 
Act (61 of 2003) and the Consumer Protection Act (68 of 2008).   In my opinion, 
neither the salary or capitation models capture quite this same focus.   In a sense, 
the findings suggested in this research in some way represent a kind of ‘moral 
compass’ for health care.   For this reason, such findings should probably be 
examined for validity independently of their actual application to payment models in 
private health care.   If sound, they could be applied as one among many 
foundational guides for the design of such models.   By reflection, any resulting 
model could then also be morally evaluated on the basis of its compliance / non-
compliance with these moral guidelines.   Furthermore, it probably follows that 
unless the need for a robust moral framework is rejected altogether, it would be 
incumbent on any alternative payment model to demonstrate either (1) how such a 
model happens to already comply with similar moral requirements, or alternatively 
(2) what equally compelling and ethically sound arguments are provided in support of 
an alternative moral framework. 
 
This report represents an initial moral probe into a relatively controversial, but 
fundamental area of private health care.   In addition, since many of the principles 
outlined here are morally fundamental to the provision of health care services 
generally they are in many respects applicable to both private and public health 
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sectors and their policy designs – locally and internationally.   I have outlined and 
acknowledged the inherent limitations of this research.   The vastly different contexts 
and practical realities to which the payment debate potentially applies simultaneously 
represents the unique challenges faced in any kind of attempt at serious payment 
model reform.   Further discussion, criticism and constructive development of its 
central arguments is therefore encouraged to enable mature application of this and 
similar research to the payment debate, future payment models and consequently 
the promotion of patients’ best interests.   The explorative nature of this research 
(probably unsurprisingly) poses many more questions than it actually provides 
answers.   To the extent that the payment debate seriously considers these 
questions, I would argue that the inevitable focus they bring on ordinary people in 
need of health care effectively connects them (both people and questions) to the 
solution in a way that is both necessary and elegantly difficult to ignore. 
 
In this report I have described the various payment models for private practitioner 
remuneration, and evaluated the moral suitability of the adopted fee-for-service 
model in the South African context.   I have reviewed the ethical fundamentals of 
caring for patients and promoting their best interests.   The fee-for-service model as 
it is applied to private practice has been analysed and shown to be poorly-compliant 
with accepted moral fundamentals.   In conclusion I have defended the thesis that 
the current remuneration model for private medical practitioners is not morally 
justifiable as it does not promote a paying patient’s best interests.   In the absence of 
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specific and viable alternatives to the current payment models I have proposed how 
a simple moral checklist could be generally applied in order to safeguard promotion 
of a patient’s best interests. 
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